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Non-randomness of Genetic Mutations: 
Some Philosophical Implications
The task of both scientists and philosophers is to doubt, question the supposed 
truth and challenge scientific claims. This article meets the task of challenging 
evolutionary theory’s (neo-Darwinian) claims of the random nature of genetic 
mutations. The neo-Darwinists’ theory of biological evolution views the trans-
formation of living forms through stages of random mutations and non-random 
natural selection.  Mutations are, by the definition of randomness, not caused 
by or aimed at the benefit of the organisms in which they occur. However, some 
experiments question the randomness of mutations claiming their non-random 
nature, and conceptual analysis points to the ambiguity of the concept of ran-
domness and the notion of usefulness. In addition, it is not justified to apply 
the conceptual and methodological toolkit from physics in biology (except in 
molecular biology), because biology has its own domain with corresponding 
special concepts, principles and methodology. Harmonisation of the conceptual 
meanings indicates that the nature of non-random mutation process confirmed 
the specific economy of biological evolution. The evolutionary implication of 
the non-random nature of mutation process presumes a world in which the 
occurrence of biological diversity is highly probable.
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Karl Marx: »Die Philosophen haben die Welt nur verschieden interpretiert; 
es kommt aber darauf an, sie zu verändern«.1
Jerry Fodor: »Biologist have changed neo-Darwinism in many ways; the point 
now is to subvert it«.2 
INTRODUCTION
It has been generally accepted that the theory of biological evolution is 
related to a process of emergence of quantity and quality diversification from 
a few or even one form (LUCA); however, there is a dispute concerning the 
principle underlying and governing these changes. Evolutionary experts are 
in a unanimous agreement when it comes to interpreting the properties of 
the causal relationship responsible for the evolutionary processes, as well as 
concerning the very nature of the principle governing evolution. Previously, I 
also thought that the evolutionary story sounded quite logical and irrefutable, 
but after insight into the results of experimental biology, which sometimes 
show a different nature of the structure of the theory of evolution, I began to 
doubt. Despite the explanatory power of the neo-Darwinian theory of evolu-
tion, I find the explanation of the evolutionary processes, more specifically 
the nature of genetic mutations, unacceptable. An additional confusion stems 
from the issue of determining the nature of genetic mutations from the vague-
ly defined concepts of randomness and non-randomness, and as Mayr3 notes, 
in evolutionary biology most of the progress is achieved by the introduction of 
new concepts, or the improvements of existing concepts. The next step in this 
dilemma arose from a decision regarding the position of biology both inside 
and outside the system of science: if someone thinks, as I do, that biology 
is real but an independent science with its own domain, specific principles, 
concepts and methodology, than it is not possible to profit from using the 
principles, concepts and methodology of physical science in biology. 
Therefore, this article briefly presents the neo-Darwinian view of the theory 
of evolution, and then examines some conceptual issues (concepts of mutation, 
randomness and non-randomness). Thereafter, the paper brings some experi-
mental results that are contrary to the canonical view of the nature of genetic 
1 E. BLOCH. 1959. Das Prinzip Hoffnung, Band I, Weltveränderung oder Elf Thesen von Marx 
über Feuerbach. Suhrkamp Verlag Frankfurt am Mein , Frankfurt am Mein. XI these, p. 124: 
»Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change 
it«. 
2 J. FODOR and M. PIATTELLI-PALMARINI. 2010. What Darwin got wrong. Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux, New York. p. 20.
3 E. MAYR. 1982. The Growth of Biological Thought. Diversity, Evolution and Inheritance. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England, The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press. p. 23.
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mutations. Experiments indicate the relativity of the concept of benefit and 
specific nature of mutation economy, so this article discusses that concepts 
assuming that the explanation of the nature of genetic change can be misin-
terpreted because of the vagueness of terms used. The meaning of concepts 
in biology is different from that in physics and the meaning of terms should 
be matched with the area in which they are used. Thus, consistent concepts 
bring a significantly different view of the principle of evolutionary change.
1. CANONICAL VIEW
Darwin and the neo-Darwinists view the process of evolution by natural 
selection in two stages: 
1) a genetic mutation further leads to variation; 
2) natural selection favours the survival of the individuals with specific 
genetic combinations. 
A two-stage approach to the explanation of evolutionary changes implies 
essentially different natures of its components. The first component is the 
occurrence of genetic variability or genetic mutation representing a dis-
continuity of the hereditary information and is designated as random. The 
second component of evolutionary changes is the process of natural selection 
by which some genotypes are non-randomly favoured. Actually, it is not the 
genes that are exposed to natural selection; rather it is   entire organisms and 
populations, so that the selection is active at the level of phenotypes rather 
than genotypes.4 Natural selection means a differential survival and reproduc-
tion of newly formed individuals. It is precisely how Sober5, somewhat more 
generally, defines the nature of non-randomness: 
»However, when the different possibilities have drastic unequal prob-
abilities, the process is not a random one«. 
Because natural selection involves unequal probabilities, it will be safe to 
say that it is not a random process. The non-randomness of the process of nat-
ural selection is by no means disputable since different possibilities (variations) 
do not have the same or similar probability of survival and reproduction, with 
some of the possibilities being entirely ruled out.6 More specifically, different 
organisms have different degrees of probability of survival and reproduction. 
Mayr7 warns of the unsuitability of the term selection and suggests that a 
4 Many candidates tend to place evolutionary unit: genes, organisms, populations and spe-
cies.
5 E. SOBER, 2000, o. c. p. 37. 
6 Ibidem.
7 E. MAYR, 1988. Toward a New Philosophy of Biology: Observations of an Evolutionist. Cam-
bridge, Harvard University Press. p. 564.
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more suitable term – non-targeted elimination - should be introduced, show-
ing more precisely the absence from nature of a selecting force. Mayr views 
these two components as a combination of chance and anti-chance, by which 
adaptability and goal-directedness are imparted to evolution. Directedness, as 
well as certain tendencies of evolution, should not be confused with orthoge-
netic series8, since selection itself involves certain directional trends.
The diagram in Figure 1 shows a simplified canonical view of evolutionary 
pattern, facilitating a research into the logical and causal relation between 
the transfer of hereditary information and adaptation-reproduction results 
which mean a benefit for a successful phenotype or damage to an unsuccess-
ful one. 
The left side of the Figure 1a shows a hereditary substance which carries 
information concerning the building of a phenotype. Such information mainly 
8 Like nomogenesis (L. Berg), aristogenesis (H. F. Osborne) and omega principle (T. de Char-
din).
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consists of unchanged contents, but sometimes mutations occur, changing the 
original information to a greater or lesser extent; however, not in response 
to the needs of the organism in question, but merely copying mistakes dur-
ing the replication on the genetic material. It should be noted Crick’s central 
dogma by which the fundamental function of the genetic material controls the 
synthesis of proteins, and the direction of information is one-way, only from 
the nucleic acid to protein (or something else, but it is not possible to transfer 
information from protein to nucleic acids). This article is without prejudice to 
the evolutionary importance of Crick’s central dogma, though Crick’s dogma 
can be overridden according to the evolutionary importance from two direc-
tions. First, the incompleteness due to cytoplasmic inheritance9, and second 
the directional adaptive changes or enormous adaptive potentials10. Anyway, 
the aggregate of information composed of original, changed and mixed infor-
mation first reaches a rougher filter (left southpaw-Figure 1b, whose white 
circles represent the space of passage of hereditary substance) which checks 
whether the forwarded information is suited to the unchanged structure of 
the environment. Sober11 maintains that the modification of frequency of 
diverse genotypes can also be explained by non-mutation models, as the sys-
tem of mating or migration. Mayr12 completely attributes the factor of genetic 
variability to chance, whether the variability has been caused by mutation, 
recombination (by breaking up and rejoining of the parental chromosomes), or 
by genetic drift. If you do not question the belief in the principle of causality, 
then the knowledge of causal connection is the assumption of knowledge of 
evolutionary phenomena. It is not problematic to determine the conditions 
under which nothing will change, the problem is to determine the condi-
tions under which something will change. For example, Newton’s dynamics 
of motion involves the principle of equilibrium in which the state changes 
(acceleration, deceleration and change of direction) to import the balance 
of power disturbances. Similarly, there is the example of the principle under 
which the genetic equilibrium will not change: in the absence of perturbation 
factors alleles frequencies at locus remain unchanged and there is no variation 
and no possibility of evolution. Evolution requires the perturbation factors, 
with numerous candidates13: selection, mutation, meiosis, migration, genetic 
9 R. H. TAMARIN. Principles of Genetics. Boston, WCB McGraw-Hill, 1999;  D. FUTUYMA, 
1986. Evolutionary Biology. Sunderland, Massachusetts. Sinauer Associates, Inc.
10 L. PERFEITO, L. FERNANDES, C. MOTA and I. GORDO, 2007. Adaptive Mutations in Bac-
teria: High Rate and Small Effects, Science, 317: 813-815
11 E. SOBER, 2000. Philosophy of Biology. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
12 E. MAYR, 1976, o.c. p. 9.
13 P. THOMPSON, 2007. Formalisations of Evolutionary  Biology. In: Matthen M. i Stephens, C. 
(eds.), Philosophy of Biology. Amsterdam, Elsevier.
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drift, and often ignored anatomical-physiological effects and environmental 
constraints14.
Genetic differences participate in the production of various phenotypes 
forming numerous morphological properties (with respect to both quantity 
and quality), physiological properties, cytological structures (e.g. the number 
of chromosomes), pigmentation, etc., in which an additional difficulty is 
caused by the research and study of phenotype variations since genetic and 
non-genetic causes cannot be easily distinguished and separated. The concepts 
of genetic variation and genetic mutations are not synonymous, and it is some-
times not entirely clear how genetic mutation is to be defined. Mayr15 speaks 
of a conceptual confusion in the meaning of genetic mutation as interpreted 
by T.H. Morgan and De Vries. 
Changes in gene frequency may be brought about by different causes; apart 
from the selection, there is mutation, recombination, migration, pattern of 
mating and genetic drift. All these factors may simultaneously contribute 
towards changes in gene frequency, but it is the genetic mutation that results 
in a new value with respect to quality upon which all of the above causes 
of change in gene frequency are based. It is the genetic mutation that cre-
ates new individual genes and it is believed that there is no law controlling 
the direction of mutations. Population genetics and evolutionary biology see 
mutation as a statistical category which, by re-forming hereditary information 
concerning the building of a phenotype and its behaviour, re-structures life 
forms regardless of potential benefit (survival-adaptation and reproduction). 
This still remains to be researched on a model facilitating an observation of 
evolutionary entities and their complex interrelations
A completely invariable structure of the environment represents a sim-
plified idealisation since such an environment does not exist: it is really the 
elements of the environment that change extremely slowly, like universal 
physical laws in the form, for example, of existence and size of the gravi-
tational force responsible for various symmetrical relations of living forms 
or atomic-molecular properties determining numerous quantity and quality 
relations within organisms. The constant rate of oxygen and other gases in 
the atmosphere within geological time, falls into this category, i.e. can be 
regarded as a relatively unchangeable structure of the environment. By the 
absence of cataclysmic occurrences which would affect this, the relatively 
invariable structure of the environment, the hereditary substance containing 
14 R. FALK, 2007. Genetic Analysis. In: Matthen M. i Stephens, C. (eds.), Philosophy of Biology. 
Amsterdam, Elsevier.
15 E. MAYR, 1997. This is biology: the science of the living world. Cambridge, Massachusetts 
and London, England, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, p. 68.: »1) A sudden 
change in the genetic substance» and 2) evolutionary change immediately resulting in a new 
species«.
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an unchanged information in creating a phenotype, passes the first selection 
filter relatively easily. Constant or relatively constant structures of the environ-
ment favour the unchanged information, or changed in the form of structures 
which could even better utilise the given parameters, e.g. symmetrical pat-
terns or an improvement in the utilisation of mixture of atmospheric gases. 
Nonetheless, any information disregarding or violating the basic laws of such 
constant structures could not be admitted any further. Mutations carrying 
the changed information concerning the building of a phenotypes in the event 
of collision with relatively constant environmental structures would come 
to a halt upon reaching the first filter. Such mutations are lethal and imply 
the rejection of genetically proposed instructions concerning the building 
of a modified phenotype. It could be said that a non-correspondence of the 
organism structure to its environment in crucial points of form would mean 
that such an organism would be eliminated. Mutations which are not in col-
lision with constant structures represented by this filter may come across yet 
another environmental selection filter whose structure changes more rapidly 
(the right southpaw-Figure 1c, whose smaller rotational plates more frequently 
alter the conditions permitting the passage of various mutations) as an exam-
ple consider climatic changes and the related changes in food resources. This 
filter is capable of stopping and rejecting some changed bits of information, 
but it can also let them go through, thus creating a new, more successful phe-
notype. The second selection filter can, under changed conditions, stop some 
of the so far successful constant gene instructions, finding their phenotypes 
not to be sufficiently well adapted. 
2. CONCEPTUAL ISSUES
Genetic mutations are frequently attributed as anomalous by nature; they 
are considered to be »erroneous or faulty« DNA replications. The phenomenon 
of mutation rate, proved by various experimental methods, establishes an 
average mutation rate on the basis of DNA pairs per cell division in monocel-
lular organisms or per gamete in »higher« organisms respectively. It therefore 
follows that we are by no means dealing with an anomaly of any kind, should 
anomaly be defined as an event which is subject to no law, regularity or pat-
tern, but rather with a constant and predictable process with determined 
average values. The possibility of determining the mutation rate further proves 
a logical relation between the mutation occurrences and the »normal« transfer 
of hereditary material (whose information is not subject to change) onto new 
generations, i.e. it demonstrates a regularity of such occurrences. The model 
illustrated in Fig. 1 shows logical and causal relations of the transfer of essen-
tially different hereditary information concerning the building of a phenotype 
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and its evolutionary fate. The logical relation, i.e. the regularity of the process, 
is clear, since without the transfer of hereditary information there can be no 
creation of phenotype, regardless of the ultimate evolutionary outcome. A 
causal relation of the occurrence of successful phenotypes may be viewed in 
a similar way because we always deal with a regular sequence leading from 
mutation towards successful or unsuccessful phenotypes. A different sequence 
of events would be impossible to imagine, therefore allowing us to establish a 
constant common occurrence of mutations and successful phenotypes. What 
is necessary, however, is to identify and separate the causes underlying the 
dispersion of results of mutations characterised as beneficial, harmful, or neu-
tral. An intuitive idea emerging in the process would require the relation of a 
particular specific mutation or a more complex mutation entity and its benefits 
for the organism to be determined. Since the idea of one gene carrying one 
trait16 has been long abandoned, it is necessary to understand that mutation 
in itself by no means represents a primary source of phenotypic variations. 
Therefore, although mutation ultimately remains the main source of all genetic 
variation, the main source of phenotypic variation is much richer in content 
(different genetic and non-genetic variation, epistasis, slight variations in the 
regulation of genes or timing of activation of those genes, even as the result 
of the same genes of gene complexes). Such a mutation entity on its way to 
phenotypic realisation produces some of the aforementioned results (useful, 
harmful and neutral). In terms of category, it is by no means easy to determine 
the properties of such results: a beneficial mutation means that such a pheno-
type has some, if only minimal advantages over other phenotypes of the same 
population, ensuring also other advantages in utilising the resources of the 
ecological niche and reproduction. Such a phenotype is more suitable and bet-
ter adapted. The mutation, whose effect may be designated as harmful, results 
in a phenotype which is either totally incapable of survival and reproduction 
(the so-called lethal mutation) or has, by its properties, a reduced chance of 
survival and reproduction in comparison to other phenotypes of the same 
population. Neutral mutations are those which cannot be identified as result-
ing in any phenotypic changes in the selection competition, i.e. as resulting in 
any determined physiological effect. By category determination the ultimate 
results of the relation between mutation events and the selection process are 
defined, however, it says nothing about actual relations between particular 
mutation entities and the ultimate outcomes of evolutionary processes. 
The concept of randomness, in its broadest definition, sees various possibil-
ities as having the same or similar degree of probability. Figuratively speaking, 
16 So-called beanbag concept, according to Mendelian compared the genetic content of popu-
lation to a bag of colored beans. Mayr thinks that considering genes as independent units 
is meaningless from the physiological and the evolutionary viewpoint (J. FODOR and M. 
PIATTELLI-PALMARINI, 2010, p. 25.)
Non-randomness of Genetic Mutations: Some Philosophical Implications
165
randomness can most easily (though inaccurately) be compared to a game of 
lottery in which every ticket has an equal probability of winning. A more pre-
cise comparison, however, may utilise the time of the semi-disintegration of 
a chemical element half of whose atoms will certainly disintegrate, but which 
atoms they will be and why these particular atoms cannot be determined with 
any certainty since all of the atoms have an equal probability of disintegra-
tion in a given time – if this is really true, it could be confirmed by one of the 
lives of Schrödinger’s cat. It has been universally accepted that randomness 
of mutation processes means that their very occurrence is not dictated by the 
benefit of the organism in question. Sober17 says that: »Mutations are said 
to be ‘random’ in that they do not arise because they would be beneficial to 
the organism in which they occur«. Wright18 similarly defines the concept of 
random mutation: »By the neo-Darwinian definition, a mutation is random 
if it is unrelated to the metabolic function of the gene and if it occurs at a 
rate that is undirected by specific selective conditions of the environment«. 
Addressing the same issue, Mayr19 claims that: 
»There is no connection between the molecular event and its poten-
tial significance - neither the underlying molecular phenomena nor the 
mechanical motions involved in some of these processes are related to 
their biological effects«. 
Sober allows for the possibility of physical events resulting in a higher 
probability of particular mutations: »There may be physical reasons why a 
given mutagen-radiation, for example – has a higher probability of produc-
ing one mutation than some other«, while Tamarin20  thinks that: »... we note 
that we view mutation as a process that occurs randomly, not because a cell 
‘needs’ a particular mutation«.
Furthermore, Tamarin points out that randomness of mutations does not 
mean that the occurrence of different mutations has an equal degree of prob-
ability.
3. BIOLOGICAL FACTS
Mutation is the primary source of all genetic variation. It is only on the 
basis of mutation that all other causes of genetic variation can be added. But 
what is mutation? By introducing the concept of mutation into biology, De 
17 E. SOBER, o.c., p. 37.
18 B. E. WRIGHT. 2000. A Biochemical Mechanism for Nonrandom Mutations and Evolution. 
Journal of Bacteriology, Vol. 182, No. 11, p. 2995.
19 E. MAYR, 1982., p. 58.
20 R. H. TAMARIN, 1999, p. 489.
Nova prisutnost 8 (2010) 2, 157-175
166
Vries21 wanted to identify and designate a process by which a new species is 
created, more specifically a process of a sudden change in phenotype. The 
term mutation was equally used as the process and its result, as well as for 
describing changes in both genotype and phenotype. With the development 
of genetics the term became exclusively reserved for the area of genetics, but 
not unarguably. Mayr22 mentions mutation being defined by some authors 
as: »...any error in gene replication« or »Anything that could interfere with 
the normal process of gene replication might result in a mutation«. Others 
maintain that there is a separate gene unit of mutation, designating it by the 
term muton. In regards to mutation, Futuyma23 claims the following: »Muta-
tions are of many kinds, and their variety appears still to be growing as more 
molecular information comes to light«. By this Futuyma apparently means 
several types of mutation (point mutation: a substitution of one base pair 
for another; frameshift mutation: the deletion of insertion of a single base 
changes the reading frame; back mutation: reversion of a mutant allele to the 
original form). Contemporary genetics24 speaks of mutation as: »... both the 
process by which a gene (or chromosome) changes structurally and the end 
result of that process«. 
Of course, different phenotypes may be the result of the same genes or gene 
complexes (differential gene regulation), also. Anyway, mutation is undoubt-
edly a factor fundamentally important to evolutionary changes, but what are 
mutations caused by? Although the laboratory research by induced mutations 
have resulted in the discovery of numerous mutagene factors, e.g. chemical, 
physical, or radiation, mutation may also spontaneously occur as an erroneous 
DNA replication which has been claimed to have no connection whatsoever 
with its biological effect. 
Contrary to this, Cowan25 claims that:
»It is possible that microbiology may provide the evidence that Lamarck’s 
followers have been seeking, for a microbial population (a strain) that 
acquires a property in a new environment may retain it for some time 
when transferred back to the old, though a re-adaptation may sometimes 
occur within five generations«.
21 H. De VRIES, 1901. Die Mutationstheorie. Leipzig.
22 E. MAYR, 1982. The Growth of Biological Thought. Diversity, Evolution and Inheritance. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England, The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, p. 804. 
23 D. FUTUYMA, 1986, p. 65.
24 R. H. TAMARIN, 1999,  p. 466.
25 S. T. COWAN, 1962. The Microbial Species-A Macromyth? Symp. Soc. Gen. Microbial., 12 
(Microbial Classification), 433-455, p. 439.
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Cowan is not alone in such claims, Cairns26 claims that mutations to be 
occurring because the cells need them, calling such occurrences directed 
mutation or adaptive mutation. Apart from Cairns’ paper, which was based 
on research conducted on E. coli involving genes which did not allow the 
use of lactosis as a source of energy, Tamarin27 mentions that similar results 
have been obtained by other scientists utilising other organisms and different 
genes. Hall28 seems to share this opinion by claiming that some experimental 
results can be interpreted in corroboration of an allegation that individual 
organisms are capable of adaptively changing their genomes in response to 
variable environmental conditions while passing on the acquired properties to 
their offspring, as Lamarck had thought. Furthermore, the hypothesis about 
the non-random nature of gene mutations should by no means be confused 
with teleological interpretations of the nature of movable gene elements, trans-
posons, by which, allegedly29, the evolutionary suitability of certain bacteria 
can be improved. These gene elements are sometimes described as seemingly 
non-functional, representing really strategic reserves which in future could 
be used for meeting the newly created needs requirements. Also, Wright30 
recently describes the biochemical mechanism for non-random mutation and 
evolution that were predicted by mathematicians. Wright writes similarly 
to Mayr (see footnote 16) about the meaning of the concept of random or 
spontaneous mutation: »In a scientific context, the word spontaneous is mean-
ingless. Every event is preceded, and dependent upon, innumerable known 
and unknown prior events and circumstances«.  Wright31 argues that the 
causes, in this case of mutations, sometimes are non-random: »…hypermuta-
tion resulting from derepression (derepression is a mechanism which occurs 
in response to starvation for an essential substrate or for an end product that 
represses its own synthesis by feedback inhibition, A/N) is localized as a direct 
consequence of a specific response to environmental challenge«. This approach 
is clearly contrary to anti-Darwinist view because of the direct influence of 
environment. In support of this thesis is Salvini-Plawen and Mayr’s32 evidence 
of independent evolution of the eye on at least 40, very different species. 
26 J. CAIRNS, J. OVERBAUGH, and S. MILLER, 1988. The origin of mutants. Nature 335, 
/001014/145.
27 R. H. TAMARIN, o.c.
28 B. G. HULL, 1988. Adaptive Evolution that Requires Multiple Spontaneous Mutations. Ge-
netics, 120: 887-897.
29 R. H. TAMARIN, o.c.
30 B. E. WRIGHT. 2000. A Biochemical Mechanism for Nonrandom Mutations and Evolution. 
Journal of Bacteriology, 182: 2993-3001.
31 Ibid, p. 2995.
32 L. V. SALVINI-PLAWEN and E. MAYR. 1977. On the Evolution of Photoreceptors and Eyes. 
Evolutionary Biology, 10: 207-263. 
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At the end of this chapter, it is important to mention that Dobzhansky33 
also considers that the most serious objection to the neo-Darwinist version of 
the theory of evolution arises precisely from the accepting nature of genetic 
mutations as random and that it is difficult to see how mutation and selection 
can add up to the formation of beautifully balanced organs as eyes. 
4. RELATIVITY OF BENEFIT CONCEPT
Natural selection is not a random process because different possibili-
ties (variations) do not have the same or similar probability of survival and 
reproduction, i.e. different phenotypes have different degrees of probability of 
survival and reproduction34. Natural selection is like a filter which admits into 
existence only variations capable of adapting in the given existing geological, 
climatic and environmental system. It is precisely due to their being different 
that some variations have a probability of survival, which serves to corroborate 
the hypothesis that natural selection is not random, i.e. does not happen by 
chance. In the course of adaptation, more suitable characteristics seem to be 
occurring increasingly frequently, while the less suitable ones are becoming 
rare, resulting in the survival of only those organisms possessing more suit-
able properties. Adaptation is one of the basic features of evolution despite 
all the differences and disagreement concerning the extent of its influence 
upon the direction of evolutionary processes. Nevertheless, no one doubts the 
existence of adaptation trends which represent a clear interrelation between 
inanimate and living nature. The strength of the concept of adaptation can 
be corroborated by the fact that it is sometimes used to define life itself, thus 
Dawkins35 says: »Living things ... they are adaptively complex«. In the same 
paper Dawkins points out the adaptive complexity by employing a crucial 
criterion for the definition of life, claiming that explaining the phenomenon of 
adaptation is the basic issue to be resolved by any theory of biological evolu-
tion. Namely, from all possible ways of arranging the total number of atoms 
in some living organisms,36 only a very small number of combinations would 
constitute automata that work to keep themselves into being and multiply 
similar products. The process of adaptation takes place under the pressure 
of selection by the evolutionary modification of organism properties in order 
to achieve an efficient functioning, i.e. increasing suitability in a certain con-
33 T. DOBZHANSKY. 1950. The genetic basis of evolution. Scientific American, 182: 32-41.
34 A. ROSENBERG and D. McSHEA,  2008. Philosophy of Biology: A Contemporary Introduc-
tion. New York, Routledge.
35 R. DAWKINS, 1998. Universal Darwinism. In D. L. HULL and M. RUSE (eds.): The Philoso-
phy of Biology, 15-38. New York: Oxford University Press Inc, p. 17.
36 For example, human body which contains 1027.
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text of relations between the organism, population and the environment. It 
is precisely due to the fact that biological processes take place in time and 
within a space characterised by the variable properties of the environment 
that a substantial determination of usefulness or harmfulness of particular 
mutation becomes virtually impossible. Colbourne, Constantin, Dobell and 
Fehres37 says: 
»Mutations that are not meant an advantage, or even been opposing it, 
may become desirable in the new environment. In this situation, muta-
tions provide a selective advantage in the new environment«. 
Therefore the same mutations may be beneficial or harmful. The envi-
ronment with its changeable geological, physical, climatic and ecological 
properties does not direct the adaptation process, but compares all the avail-
able phenotypic forms with the currently existing possibilities of survival. 
General conditions of the environment constitute a peculiar mould into which 
the available forms may or may not fit. A more frequent and complete corre-
spondence in structure between the organisms and the environment increases 
the chances of survival, and organisms cumulate an increased quantity of 
information of their surroundings. A change in the mould constantly requires 
new variations of living forms capable of fitting into the existing available 
moulds. Vollmer38 compares adaptation with the concept of representation 
as an indication of an environment resembling a horse’s hoof representing a 
prairie or a fish fin symbolising water and the laws of hydrodynamics. Does 
this mean that better adapted organisms have an advantage over less adapted 
ones when it comes to survival? The answer to this question is not as simple as 
it appears; namely an imaginary perfectly adapted phenotype would require a 
partner in the form of an unchangeable mould in an ideal environment which 
is not possible in the physical world. Such a phenotype would »waste« numer-
ous generations of its species in order to achieve no more than an ephemeral 
perfection which would shortly be condemned to stagnation, because of its 
excessive adaptation, or, more likely, extinction. In biological terms a perfect 
adaptation taken as an absolute suitability to a particular ecological niche 
means an obvious setback; what is more useful is the production of optimum 
solutions for an adaptation with a  relation to the environment as open and 
independent as possible. The specific nature of the concept of ideal adapta-
tion in the domain of biology actually implies variability and tolerance, and 
mutations can act in favour of such a type of adaptation, but also against it. 
An ideal and complete adaptation in the conditions of a constantly changing 
37 H. COLBOURNE, B. CONSTANTIN, D. DOBELLl and C. FEHRES, 2007. Inquiry into Biol-
ogy. Toronto, McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd, p. 117.
38 G. VOLLMER, 1984. Mesocosm and objective knowledge. In: Wuketits, F. M.(ed.), Concept 
and Approaches in Evolutionary Epistemology. Dodrecht, D. Reidel.
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world is not only unnecessary: it is also undesirable, even harmful, because 
an absolute correspondence in structure between the organism and its envi-
ronment could be only attained for a negligibly short sequence of time. It is 
much more beneficial for the organism to produce merely »sufficiently good« 
adaptation, capable of ensuring its survival. Mutation stimulated variability 
and adaptation process cannot be evaluated in terms of usefulness/harmful-
ness in any other way but by comparison to the conditions of the environment. 
The fixed goal of successful survival has no concrete predetermined constants: 
its values are open and variable. What is suitable and useful in one situation 
does not have to be so in a different situation and vice versa. It is sometimes 
precisely the so-called harmful mutations that represent an advantage, as in 
the following extreme case: haemoglobin in its heterozygote form in human 
population is known to cause sickle-cell anaemia, whereas in a malaria-in-
fested environment it protects such individuals39. How is it then possible to 
characterise a causal relation between a particular mutation and its effect, 
reducing it to a phenotype? The specific position of a particular mutation 
in relation to time and space determines its designation as either useful or 
harmful, it is therefore obvious that the concepts of usefulness and harmful-
ness in terms of mutations and evolutionary fate cannot be substantially, but 
rather relatively defined. I should also mention a statement about the random-
ness of mutations by advocating independent occurrences of variations with 
regard to the needs of an organism in conditions of a given environment, 
i.e. claiming that mutation bears no impact on the organism in its entirety. 
Conversely, the relation between the genotype and phenotype constitutes a 
relation of a complex system of expression interaction of hereditary units, 
genes, the given environment, organism development, population and the 
computer science concept of developmental noise. The course of development 
is not completely determined even by the joint action of genotype and the 
environment because, according to Waddington40, the epigenetic process is a 
system of channels (canalisation or capacitor41) varying in depth, rendering it 
impossible to be disturbed in one part, while in the other segments it changes 
in various degrees, depending upon the conditions of the environment. The 
direction of development of a particular cell does not exclusively depend upon 
the genetic instruction of that cell, nor does it depend on the conditions of 
the environment, but on the condition and status of the adjacent cells. Fodor 
and Piattelli-Palmarini writes: 
39 M. D. GRMEK, 1989. Bolesti u osvit zapadne civilizacije. Zagreb, Globus. 
40 C. H. WADINGTON, 1957. The Strategy of the Genes. London, Allen and Unwin.
41 J. FODOR and M. PIATTELLI-PALMARINI. 2010. What Darwin got wrong. Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux, New York. p. 39.
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»...the sorts of cases reported here do not suggest an adaptationist treat-
ment; in consequence, they were largely forgotten until the emergence of 
epigenetic revived an interest in Waddington’s experiment«.42 
For example, in Drosophile, certain sexual cells can, regardless of their 
developmental instruction, be transformed into legs and antennae, depending 
on the choice of the adjacent cells. Therefore, should a substantial definition of 
the relation between the occurrence of mutation and evolutionary outcomes 
be rendered impossible and replaced by a relative one, how could we claim 
that a particular mutation is purely random if its effect is useful within the 
limits of a certain place and time, while in another it could prove harmful 
for the organism? How is it possible to know that an occurrence of a specific 
mutation does not depend on its usefulness for the organism when it cannot 
be unambiguously determined what is beneficial and what is harmful for a 
particular organism? The solution lies in the relativity of the definition of 
the concepts of usefulness/harmfulness, but also in the specific nature of the 
mutation economy.
5. SPECIFIC NATURE OF MUTATION ECONOMY
Mutation is a concept whose nature has to be defined with respect to the 
organism, population and the environment. The property of usefulness or 
harmfulness can only be determined in relation to the comprehensive and 
concrete conditions of the environment, where upon it might be possible to 
reflect upon whether discussing the random nature of mutation made sense 
at all. I believe that the nature of mutations can be explained as non-random-
ness, entirely compatible with the economy of nature. Population genetics and 
evolution choose to look upon mutation processes as a statistical category 
creating new forms of life or participating in their formation, depending on 
how they understand the principle of evolutionary changes. Describing the 
relations between a particular specific mutation and its usefulness or harmful-
ness is nothing but an inappropriate isolation of a mutation process from its 
complexity from which it is inseparable, otherwise the same mutation could 
be claimed to be both useful and harmful (e.g. the above quoted radical exam-
ple of the occurrence of haemoglobin in its heterozygotic form in humans). 
The occurrence of a specific mutation is directly related to its usefulness for 
the organism in question. However, variable conditions of the environment, 
the factor of time and space, as well as its occurrence within the complex of 
other mutations, frequently cause confusion. Continual occurrence of muta-
tion complexes makes it possible to identify and isolate specific mutations 
42 J. FODOR and M. PIATTELLI-PALMARINI, 2010, o.c. p. 61.
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necessary for the organism at a specific actual point in time and place with 
its specific requirements. Potentially useful and harmful mutations co-occur 
within the mutation complex in order to respond to all possible challenges 
as dictated by the time and space, whereby specific mutations are isolated, 
depending on the current needs. Any response of the organism or environ-
ment structures is necessarily temporary, as is the adaptation. It is therefore 
naive to demand that merely an isolated occurrence of a specific mutation in 
a successful phenotype containing an adaptation novelty should be declared 
as pertaining to the indispensable nature of mutation. The fact that large cats 
catch their prey with a success ratio of 1:9 does not mean that all unsuccess-
ful attempts could be declared useless for the organisms of these animals. 
All attempts at hunt, whether successful or not, constitute a statistical whole, 
similar to the mutation effects, both successful and unsuccessful, for a par-
ticular organism. A particular mutation is not an entity – a mutation complex 
represents an entity, in very much the same way as a population or a species, 
and not an individual organism, constitutes an evolutionary entity. Mutation 
complex is an entity which behaves as a whole, despite the existence of an 
internal structure, very similar to the atom. Furthermore, what should be 
understood is the specific nature of the economy of mutation processes which 
departs from other scientific fields, as for example physics, chemistry, even the 
economy of biological processes pertaining to a different level. Physical laws 
impose upon atoms in a stable condition an existence at the lowest energy 
stages which can be changed only discontinuously, whereas chemical laws 
govern chemical bonds between atoms based on the electron exchange at the 
least possible loss of energy. A similar thing happens in the area of economy 
of forming living organisms, utilising the smallest possible number of atoms 
in creating a gene, which is capable of ensuring an orderly and lawful behav-
iour in accordance with statistical physics43. The most economical (the best 
arranged) status of metabolical processes has a high degree of usefulness in 
which entropy is the lowest, so that out of the total quantity of solar energy 
contained in a molecule of glucose, an organism can utilise almost one half.44 
An electron assuming the orbit requiring the lowest level of energy, chemi-
cal bonds between atoms at the lowest possible loss of energy, as well as the 
economy of glucoses oxidation, all represent phenomena essentially differing 
from the nature of mutation processes and evolution. Physical, chemical, and, 
to an extent, physical-chemical laws in living organisms are general, universal 
laws which, by definition, are not limited by a specific time or space, but are 
valid everywhere and at all times (they are symmetrical). Such laws are the 
subject of nomothetical sciences. Living organisms are different in nature: 
43 E. SCHRÖDINGER, 1944, What is life? Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press.
44 For example, in humans the efficiency is 44%.
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apart from their compliance with general and universal laws, they necessarily 
dwell in a particular time and space as historical entities as well, and there-
fore need to be individually studied. Specific processes unfolding in living 
organisms do not in any way violate physical or chemical laws, but cannot be 
reduced to them, predicted or integrally explained by them.  Sober45 remarks 
that biologists most frequently avoid the use of the word law due to the fact 
that biology is only partially a nomothetical science, while to a certain extent 
it is also historical. Similar views about the structure of biological science can 
be found in Rosenberg46, Rosenberg and McShea47, Mayr48 and others. 
This is precisely why there exists a different nature of economical proc-
esses in the inanimate and the living worlds, particularly when it comes to 
evolution and mutation-phenotypic logical and causal relations. The economy 
of the mutation-phenotypic relation, according to which mutation is viewed 
as occurring for the benefit of the organism, can be compared to Malthus’49 
economy of procreating seemingly overabundant offspring in accordance with 
the astounding force of life. Similarly, an abundant and incessant »rain« of 
changed information contained in the hereditary substance is by no means 
random or accidental: it serves to enable a new item of information to occa-
sionally emerge, up to that moment perhaps neutral or harmful, which in the 
specific newly created conditions of the environment would build such a phe-
notype structure as would be capable of ensuring an advantage in the changed 
conditions. The economy of mutation processes is therefore no less thrifty 
or economical than other economies: it spends the least possible energy in 
producing new forms. What superficially may seem as prodigality and extrava-
gance is really a readiness to re-form, in accordance with the occurrence of 
very diverse ecological niches. The model as illustrated in Fig. 1 shows that it 
is most economical to have a permanent divergence of hereditary information 
in order to be able to pass on the instructions concerning the building of a 
phenotype through variable plates of the selection filter. An additional reason, 
frequently causing confusion concerning the nature of the economy of muta-
tion processes, is the Western economic reasoning restricted by a paradigm 
of transformation of all things into commodities with a shareholding type of 
ownership and governed by a principle of attaining the most benefit and gain-
ing the highest profit in the shortest time possible and at the least expense.
45 E. SOBER, o.c.
46 A. ROSENBERG, 1994. Instrumental Biology or the Disunity of Science. Chicago, Chicago 
University Press.; A. ROSENBERG, 1985. The Structure of Biological Science. New York, 
Cambridge University Press.
47 A. ROSENBERG and D. McSHEA, 2008. D. 2008. Philosophy of Biology: A Contemporary 
Introduction. New York, Routledge.
48 E. MAYR. 2004. What Makes Biology Unique?: Considerations on the autonomy of a scientific 
discipline.  Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
49 T. MALTHUS,  An Essay on the Principle of Population, published 1789.
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6. CONJECTURE
According to the neo-Darwinist version theory of evolution, the transform-
ing of living species happens by the principle of random mutation events and 
non-random natural selection. Mutations are attributed to a nature of ran-
domness by claiming that they do not occur to benefit particular organisms. 
This statement is corroborated by the existence of a large number of harmful 
mutations and only a small number of useful ones. Since living organisms 
and populations are not subject to nomothetical laws but require a historical 
study in real conditions of space and time, it becomes obvious that concepts 
of usefulness and harmfulness of particular mutations cannot be substan-
tially, but only relatively defined. What is useful in one situation may not 
be so in another, which is why it is impossible to establish whether a muta-
tion has occurred for the benefit of the organism, nor is it possible to say 
whether or not it is random. It is only in relation to the environment that a 
mutation can be called useful or harmful. A possible solution to the problem 
of defining mutation in terms of usefulness or harmfulness may lie in an 
idea which takes mutation complexes (rather than individual mutations) as 
an evolutionary entity participating, together with natural selection, in the 
evolutionary transforming of living species. Mutations occur for the benefit 
of organisms, and it is its occurrence within the complex of other mutations 
that causes confusion. Another reason for talking about a random nature of 
genetic mutations stems from failing to understand the specific economy of 
the mutation-phenotype relation. Due to environmental conditions continu-
ously changing, mutation events produce an abundant rain of variations which 
constantly examine the current conditions of the environment. The mutation 
complex is bound to produce a wide range of instructions concerning the 
building of a phenotype instead of strict directions, since an ideal biological 
adaptation implies openness, variability and tolerance. Continuous occurrence 
of a mutation complex ensures the isolation of a specific required mutation, 
depending on the needs of the organism, population and the circumstances 
of environment. It is possible to say that mutations are consequently occur 
for the benefit of organisms; however, the economy of mutation processes is 
not comparable to the economy of physics, chemistry or biological processes 
pertaining to a different level. Evolutionary implications of the hypothesis 
according to which mutation events are non-random in nature indicate that 
nature is arranged and finally tuned towards order, complexity and the advent 
of life. In nature thus conceived, the mutation-phenotype relation is nothing 
more than a physical analogy of the electron path, assuming its position in 
orbit in accordance with the physical laws to which it is subject. The idea of 
the non-random nature of mutation processes presupposes a world in which 
the occurrence of life diversity is highly probable. 
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Tonći Kokić
Neslučajna narav genetičkih mutacija: Neke filozofske implikacije
Sažetak
Zadatak podjednako znanstvenika i filozofa je da sumnjaju, dovode u pitan-
je pretpostavljene istine i pokušavaju osporiti znanstvene tvrdnje. Ovaj rad 
ispunjava taj zadatak iskušavanjem tvrdnje (neo-darwinističke) teorije evolu-
cije o slučajnoj naravi genskih mutacija. Neo-darwinistička inačica teorije 
biološke evolucije vidi preoblikovanje živih oblika kroz stadije slučajne mutac-
ije i neslučajnog prirodnog odabira. Prema definiciji slučajnosti mutacije nisu 
prouzročene niti imaju cilj u dobrobiti organizma u kojem se pojavljuju. Ipak, 
neki pokusi dovode u pitanje slučajnost mutacija tvrdeći njihovu neslučajnu 
narav, a pojmovna analiza ukazuje na dvosmislenosti pojmova slučajnosti i 
korisnosti. Uz to, nije opravdana primjena pojmovnih i metodoloških alata 
fizike u biologiji (osim u molekularnoj biologiji), koja ima vlastito područje s 
posebnim pojmovima, načelima i metodologijom. Usklađivanje pojmovnog 
značenja ukazuje da je neslučajna narav mutacijskog procesa posvjedočena 
specifičnom ekonomijom biološke evolucije. Implikacija neslučajne naravi 
mutacijskog procesa pretpostavlja svijet u kojem je postanak biološke razno-
likosti vrlo vjerojatan. 




Napredni kapitalistički sustav je inherentno ateistički. 
Bezbožan je u svojoj konkretnoj materijalnoj praksi, kao i u 
vrijednostima i vjerovanjima koja su mu implicitna, ma koliko 
pojedini njeni pobornici pobožno dokazivali suprotno. Kao takav, 
on je ateistički na sve pogrešne načine, dok su Marx i Nietszche 
ateisti na uglavnom ispravan način. Nije vjerojatno da će društvo 
pakiranog ispunjenja, upravljane želje, menadžerske politike i 
konzumerističke ekonomije doprijeti do te dubine na kojoj bi 
se teološka pitanja uopće mogla propisno postaviti, baš kao što 
odbacuje politička i moralna pitanja koja u sebi imaju bilo kakve 
dubine. Koji bi, pobogu, bio smisao Boga u takvom uređenju, 
osim kao ideološke legitimacije, duhovne nostalgije ili sredstva 
osobnog ispetljavanja iz svijeta lišenog vrijednosti?
Jedno od mjesta na kojima su takozvane duhovne vrijednosti, 
istjerane s lica brutalno pragmatičnog kapitalizma, našle utočište 
jest New Age, koji je upravo onakva karikatura duhovnog za 
kakvu bi se i očekivalo da će je stvoriti materijalistička kultu-
ra. Otprilike kao što ljudi kamena srca plaču na srcedrpateljnu 
glazbu, tako su oni koji ne bi prepoznali istinsku duhovnu vrijed-
nost ni da im padne u krilo skloni vidjeti duhovno kao sablasno, 
eterično i ezoterično. To je, usput rečeno, ono što je Marx imao 
na umu kad je pisao o »duši svijeta bez srca, duhu bezdušnih 
prilika«. Pod time je mislio da je konvencionalna religija jedina 
vrsta srca kakvu svijet bez srca može zamisliti, po prilici kao što 
je posramljujuće prostački humor jedina vrsta komedije koju lju-
di lišeni humora mogu cijeniti. Religija koju napada Marx odaje 
upravo onakvo sentimentalno, bestjelesno shvaćanje duhovnog 
kakvo bi se i očekivalo od trezvenih materijalista.
Terry Eagleton, Razum, vjera i revolucija. Refleksije o 
raspravi oko Boga, Preveo Dinko Telećan, Zagreb, Ljevak, 
2010, 46-47.
